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Abstract 
This study considers a strategic interplay between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
privatization policy in a mixed market, and investigates the impact of the order of sequential games. 
We compare the different timeline of the game between the privatization-then-CSR and the reverse 
case of CSR-then-privatization, and highlight the significant role of the foreign shareholding ratio 
of the CSR-firm. We show that partial privatization is always optimal regardless of the timeline of 
the game, but the privatization-then-CSR yields a lower (higher) degree of privatization while a 
higher (lower) level of CSR than the CSR-then-privatization when the foreign penetration is 
sufficiently low (high). We also show that privatization-then-CSR can be a unique equilibrium in an 
endogenous timing game but socially desirable only when the foreign penetration is neither sufficiently 
low nor high. 
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1. Introduction 
In the literature of mixed oligopolies, where the public firm plays an important leading role in an 
imperfect competition market wherein it competes with private firms, one of policy issues is the 
decision by the government on whether to or how much privatize the public firms.1 In his seminal 
paper, Matsumura (1998) showed that a public firm should be partially privatized in a mixed duopoly 
market under moderate conditions with increasing costs and homogeneous products. Since then, a 
number of researches in such fields as industrial economics, public economics, international 
economics, financial economics, and development economics, have analyzed the robustness of 
partial privatization policies with focusing on various aspects of economic phenomena.2  
The literature on mixed oligopolies usually assumes that private firms maximize their own 
profits. That is, the previous works regard profit maximization as the sole objective of a private firm. 
However, since Porter and Kramer (2006) present a systematic analysis linking comparative 
advantage to corporate social responsibility (CSR), CSR activities have now become imperative 
research topics.3 Accordingly, recent researches on mixed oligopoly markets have also analyzed 
different forms of market competition wherein public firm competes with private firms that might 
adopt CSR activities. For example, Ouattara (2017) and Kim et al. (2019) examined the optimal 
privatization policies in the context of CSR activities in a mixed market with homogeneous products. 
Dong et al. (2018) and Dong and Wang (2019) considered the state-holding corporations in mixed 
oligopolies with multiple products and analyzed the relations between CSR and optimal privatization 
policy. 
All these works adopted a standard approach in the timeline of the game where the government 
can commit an optimal privatization policy and then firms compete with strategic instruments. It is 
plausible to set this type of sequential order from the divergence between the decisions on firm level 
and those on government level, which can constrain firms’ strategic spaces. However, this timeline 
might not be always realistic and practical. In the process of policy-making, if the government 
                                                          
1
 It is quite usual to observe that public firms are significant parts of the economy for many countries, such as 
China, India, Korea and Japan, especially, in steel, automobile, airline, finance, banking and other industries.  
2
 For example, Lee (2006), Matsumura and Shimizu (2010), and Lee et al. (2013) provided current policy 
issues on the optimal privatization in mixed oligopolies. 
3
 In reality, according to the PWC Global CEO survey (2016), 64% of the CEOs see CSR as a core part of 
their business and 59% of them believe social values are important to attract top employees. For recent studies, 
see Wang, et al. (2012), Chang et al. (2014), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Leal et al. (2018), Xu and Lee 
(2019), and Cho et al. (2019). 
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cannot commit credibly to the stringency of the policy, firms might have strategic incentives because 
the government has an ex-post possibility to ratchet up flexible policy.4 
In the recent literature of privatization, some papers also allowed different timelines of the 
game when the firms interact with the government in a time-inconsistent framework in which 
strategic commitment is the heart of the analysis. 5  Ino and Matsumura (2010) discussed two 
Stackelberg models in mixed markets and examined output commitment by a public firm. Ino and 
Miyaoka (2020) extended the analysis in the open economy while Haraguchi and Matsumura (2020a) 
examined implicit protectionism by a public firm under the technology transfer from foreign firms. 
In a free–entry mixed market, Xu et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2019) examined the timing of 
privatization policies with a linear demand and a specific symmetric quadratic cost, while Lee et al. 
(2018) generalized the different timeline of entry-then-privatization model. Haraguchi and 
Matsumura (2020b) also discussed how the lack of commitment to future privatization policies 
might lead to the worst welfare outcomes. However, no papers attempted to analyze the strategic 
relations between corporate social responsibility and optimal privatization policy. 
In this paper, we investigate a relationship between the optimal privatization policy and firm’s 
strategic decision on CSR, and emphasize a strategic interplay in the timing of commitment of these 
two policies. We consider not only the ability of the government to commit the optimal policy but 
also that of the firm to commit credibly to the strategic level of CSR before or after the government 
chooses the policies. In particular, we examine the timing of decisions when either the government 
or the private firm can choose the timing of decisions, sequentially and simultaneously, and 
investigate the impact of the order of the different movements. We then highlight the significant role 
of the foreign shareholding ratio of the CSR-oriented firm. 
We formulate two different scenarios, a “privatization-then-CSR” case, and a “CSR-then-
privatization” case. In the former case, the government decides the optimal privatization in the first 
stage, and then the private firm chooses the strategic CSR in the second stage, while in the latter 
case, the order of the movements is reversed. We also consider an endogenous timing game and 
examine a simultaneous movement case in which the government and the private firm can choose 
                                                          
4
 In the literature of environmental regulation, Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002) and Moner-
Colonques and Rubio (2015) examined emission tax when the regulator is not able to commit. They showed 
that firms undertake increased abatement activities generating less pollution, which might result in higher 
welfare. However, they concentrated on the private market where both firms only maximize their profits under 
environmental policies. Recently, some works examined the time inconsistency problem with the CSR firms. 
See, for example, Leal et al. (2018), Garcia et al. (2018), Lee et al. (2018), and Xu and Lee (2018). 
5
 For some discussion on the practical evidence of the commitment issue in the real examples, see the papers 
cited in Lee et al. (2018) and Ino and Miyaoka (2020). 
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the decision timing simultaneously. We then provide the equilibrium of the analysis and its policy 
implications on the timeline of the game and foreign penetration. 
These findings are in contrast to the results in the previous literature of mixed oligopolies. As 
the foreign presence in the private firm ownership increases, Lin and Matsumura (2012) shows that 
it monotonically decreases the optimal degree of privatization in a short-run equilibrium while Cato 
and Matsumura (2012) and Xu et al. (2017) show that it monotonically increases the optimal degree 
of privatization in the long-run equilibrium. However, we find that the non-monotonicity result holds 
in the presence of CSR. Further, Ouattara (2017) and Kim et al. (2019) show that active involvement 
of CSR monotonically decreases the optimal degree of privatization, regardless of nationality. 
However, we find that the non-monotonicity result holds in both different timelines of the game in 
the presence of foreign ownership. Finally, Xu et al. (2017) and Lee et al. (2018) showed that the 
timeline influences the optimal degree of privatization in the opposite direction but monotonically, 
depending on the foreign ownership. However, our findings show that the non-monotonicity might 
occur in the presence of CSR, depending on the timeline of the game. 
On the other hand, we also show that the privatization-then-CSR case yields a lower (higher) 
profit to the private firm while a higher (lower) welfare to the government than the CSR-then-
privatization case when the foreign penetration is sufficiently low (high). It implies that the incentive 
of choosing the timing of the game differs between the government and the private firm, and it 
depends crucially on foreign penetration. In an endogenous timing game, we show that both 
sequential choice and simultaneous choice can be an equilibrium, but the privatization-then-CSR case 
is not only a unique equilibrium but also socially desirable when the foreign penetration is neither 
sufficiently low nor high. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model in 
which a partially privatized public firm competes with a private firm with CSR activities in a mixed 
duopoly. Section 3 analyzes two different scenarios: the privatization-then-CSR case and the CSR-
then-privatization case, respectively, and Section 4 compares the main results between two cases. 
Section 5 analyzes a simultaneous model and then considers an endogens timing game in a mixed 
duopoly. Section 6 concludes the study. 
2. The model 
We consider a mixed duopoly in which both public and private firms produce homogeneous 
products in the same market. We assume possibly different objectives between the two firms. Firm 
1 is a partially privatized public firm that cares for only some portion of social welfare. Firm 2 is a 
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private firm that might engage in consumer-friendly CSR activities, but it is partially owned by 
foreign investors. 
Inverse demand is given by: 𝑝 = 1 − 𝑄, where 𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 denotes total market output and 𝑞𝑖 denotes quantities supplied by each firm. Then, consumer surplus is represented as 𝐶𝑆 = 12 𝑄2. 
Each firm’s cost function is given as: 𝐶𝑖(𝑞𝑖) = 𝑐𝑖2 𝑞𝑖2, 𝑖 = 1, 2 where 𝑐1 = 1 ≥ 𝑐2 = 𝑐 > 0 without 
loss of generality and 𝑐 ∈ (0,1] represents cost differences between the public and private firms.6 
Note also that each firm’s marginal cost is 𝑞1 and 𝑐𝑞2, respectively. The profit of the firm is given 
as: 𝜋1 = 𝑝1𝑞1 − 12 𝑞12, 𝜋2 = 𝑝2𝑞2 − 𝑐2 𝑞22.                                                                                                                                  (1) 
We follow the standard organizational assumption in Matsumura (1998) that the objective 
function of the managers of the public firm is given as: 𝑈 = (1 − 𝜃)𝑊 + 𝜃𝜋1,                                                                                                             (2) 
where 𝜃 ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of privatization, of which portion is owned by domestic 
private owners, and it is determined by a welfare-maximizing government. That is, there exists a 
separation between the public ownership and private ownership. Thus, the manager of the public 
firm maximizes the weighted average of social welfare and the profit, depending on the degree of 
privatization. Here, 𝜃 = 0 denotes that firm 1 is a fully nationalized public firm. 
On the other hand, the private firm has also a different organization in a managerial delegation 
contract in which output production decisions are delegated to a manager. That is, there exists a 
separation between ownership and management. The owner of the firm wants to maximize the profit 
but specifies a portion of consumer surplus as a CSR-initiative in an incentive contract with the 
manager.7 Then, the manager of the private firm maximizes the profit of the firm plus a fraction of 
                                                          
6
 One justification of cost difference is that the public firm might invest more in the public activities rather 
than CSR-firm in order to increase consumer’s well-being, for example, of the people in the low-income level 
or in the remoted local areas. In specific, in the objective functions in (2) and (3), we have 𝑈 = 𝜋1 + (1 −𝜃)𝐶𝑆 + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝛽)𝜋2 while 𝑉 = 𝜋2 + 𝛼𝐶𝑆. Thus, as far as 1 − 𝜃 > 𝛼 in the weights on CS, the public 
firm concerns more on the consumers than the CSR-firm. We can show that it is true in the following analysis. 
7
 A consumer-friendly CSR initiative is regarded as that the firm adopts consumer surplus as a proxy for its 
own CSR concerns. In the managerial delegation contract, the firm may strategically use the CSR initiative as 
a commitment device to expand the outputs and thus the firm that adopts CSR obtains higher profit than its 
profit-seeking competitors. For recent discussion on the theoretical relation between managerial delegation 
and CSR, see Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Lee and Park (2019) and Garcia et al. (2019) 
6 
 
consumer surplus in production. The objective function of the manager of the private firm is given 
as: 𝑉 = 𝜋2 + 𝛼𝐶𝑆,                                                                                                                                        (3) 
where 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] represents the level of consumer-friendly CSR. That is, the managerial contract 
assigns a weight to consumer surplus in its objective function. Then, it is sensible that as the firm 
places a higher incentive on CSR, it produces output aggressively. Here, 𝛼 = 0 denotes a pure 
profit-maximizing private firm. Note also that the investor of the private firm strategically chooses 
its incentive level of CSR in order to maximize its profit 𝜋2 in Eq. (1).  
Finally, considering the foreign ownership share of the private firm, we define producer surplus 
as 𝑃𝑆 = 𝜋1 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜋2, where 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] is the foreign penetration in the private firm.8 We define 
the social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus: 𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑃𝑆.                                                                                                                         (4) 
In the following analysis, we consider two different scenarios regarding the timeline of the 
game, a privatization-then-CSR case, and a CSR-then-privatization case. The game of each scenario 
runs as follows. As for the first scenario, the privatization-then-CSR case, the government decides 
the optimal degree of privatization in the first stage, and then after observing this policy, the owner 
of a private firm determines the strategic level of CSR in the second stage. As for the second scenario, 
the CSR-then-privatization case, the owner of the private firm commits the level of CSR in the first 
stage, and then, after observing this commitment, the government decides the optimal degree of 
privatization in the second stage. Finally, the two firms compete in quantities in both scenarios. We 
solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium through backward induction.  
3. The analysis 
3.1 Privatization-then-CSR case  
We first consider a standard case that the government chooses the optimal degree of privatization at 
the beginning of the game. In a Cournot model, two firms choose quantities simultaneously in the 
final stage. Then, the manager of a public firm takes the differentiation of 𝑈 in Eq. (2) with respect 
to 𝑞1  while that of the private firm takes the differentiation of 𝑉 in Eq. (3) with respect to 𝑞2 , 
respectively, which yield the followings:  
                                                          
8
 We can interpret the foreign penetration as indicating the level of market openness in financial markets. See 
Haraguchi and Matsumura (2014), Xu et al. (2017) and Lee et al. (2018).  
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𝜕𝑈𝜕𝑞1 = 𝜃(1 − 3𝑞1 − 𝑞2) + (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 2𝑞1 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑞2) = 0,       𝜕𝑉𝜕𝑞2 = 1 − 𝑞1 − 2𝑞2 − 𝑐𝑞2 + (𝑞1 + 𝑞2)𝛼 = 0.                                                                      (5) 
From Eq. (5), we obtain the equilibrium outputs  𝑞1 = 1+𝑐+𝛽−𝛽𝜃−𝛼3+2𝑐+𝛽+(2+𝑐−𝛽)𝜃−(1+𝛽+𝜃−𝛽𝜃)𝛼, 𝑞2 = 1+𝜃+𝛼3+2𝑐+𝛽+(2+𝑐−𝛽)𝜃−(1+𝛽+𝜃−𝛽𝜃)𝛼.                        (6) 
A few remarks are in order. First, the output of the public firm is decreasing in the level of CSR, 
while the output of the private firm is increasing in the level of CSR, i.e., 𝜕𝑞1𝜕𝛼 < 0 and 𝜕𝑞2𝜕𝛼 > 0. 
Second, the output of the public firm is increasing in foreign penetration, while the output of the 
private firm is decreasing in foreign penetration, i.e., 𝜕𝑞1𝜕𝛽 > 0 and 𝜕𝑞2𝜕𝛽 < 0. Third, the output of the 
public firm is decreasing in the degree of privatization, while the output of the private firm is 
increasing in the degree of privatization, i.e., 𝜕𝑞1𝜕𝜃 < 0 and 𝜕𝑞2𝜕𝜃 > 0. Finally, the output of the public 
firm is increasing in cost differences, while the output of the private firm is decreasing in cost 
differences, i.e., 𝜕𝑞1𝜕𝑐 > 0 and 𝜕𝑞2𝜕𝑐 < 0. 
The profits of the firm and social welfare are given, respectively  𝜋1 = (1+𝑐−𝛼+𝛽−𝛽𝜃)(1+𝑐−𝛽+2𝜃+2𝑐𝜃+𝛽𝜃−𝛼−2𝛽𝛼−2𝜃𝛼+2𝛽𝜃𝛼)2(3+2𝑐+𝛽+(2+𝑐−𝛽)𝜃−(1+𝛽+𝜃−𝛽𝜃)𝛼)2 ,   𝜋2 = (1+𝜃+𝛼)(2+𝑐−2𝛼−𝑐𝛼−2𝛼𝛽+2𝜃+𝑐𝜃−2𝛼𝜃+2𝛼𝛽𝜃)2(3+2𝑐+𝛽+(2+𝑐−𝛽)𝜃−(1+𝛽+𝜃−𝛽𝜃)𝛼)2 , 
𝑊 = {(1+𝜃)(7+7𝑐+2𝑐2+2𝛽+𝑐𝛽+3𝜃+𝑐𝜃−6𝛽𝜃−3𝑐𝛽𝜃)−2𝛼(1+𝑐+2𝛽+𝑐𝛽+3𝜃+2𝑐𝜃−𝛽𝜃−𝑐𝛽𝜃−2𝛽2𝜃+𝜃2−3𝛽𝜃2+2𝛽2𝜃2)−(1+𝑐−2𝛽−𝑐𝛽−2𝛽2−2𝛽𝜃+2𝛽2𝜃)𝛼2}2(3+2𝑐+𝛽+(2+𝑐−𝛽)𝜃−(1+𝛽+𝜃−𝛽𝜃)𝛼)2 .                                                   (7) 
In the second stage, the owner of the private firm chooses the level of CSR that maximizes its 
profit. The differentiation of 𝜋2 in Eq. (7) with respect to 𝛼 yields:9 𝛼 = (1+𝜃)(1−𝛽+𝛽𝜃)𝑐(2+𝜃)+(3+𝜃)(1+𝛽+𝜃−𝛽𝜃).                                                                                                       (8) 
Note that the level of CSR is decreasing in foreign penetration and cost difference, i.e., 𝜕𝛼𝜕𝛽 < 0 and 𝜕𝛼𝜕𝑐 < 0. That is, if the foreign penetration in the private firm increases, this firm will choose a lower 
level of CSR. Further, an increase in the cost of the private firm leads to a lower level of CSR. Note 
                                                          
9
 In the below, we can show that the interior solutions exist in the privatization-then-CSR case, i.e., 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] 
in the possible regions of 𝜃 ∈ [0,1] and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. 
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also that the level of CSR is non-monotone in the degree of privatization, i.e., 𝜕𝛼𝜕𝜃 <> 0  when 𝛽 <>  𝛽1.10Thus, the effect of privatization on the level of CSR depends on foreign penetration. In 
particular, the level of CSR is decreasing in privatization when the foreign shareholding ratio is low, 
while it is increasing in privatization when the foreign shareholding ratio is high. This represents 
that foreign penetration plays an important role in the strategic relation between the two instruments. 
In particular, CSR activities and privatization policy are substitutable when the foreign penetration 
is low, while both polices complement each other when the foreign penetration is high. 
The resulting social welfare is 
𝑊 = (1+𝜃){(2(7+10𝑐+4𝑐2+10𝛽+6𝑐𝛽+𝛽2)+4(7+7𝑐+2𝑐2−2𝛽−3𝑐𝛽−3𝛽2)𝜃+(17+11𝑐+2𝑐2−28𝛽−15𝑐𝛽+6𝛽2)𝜃2+(3+𝑐−8𝛽−3𝑐𝛽+4𝛽2)𝜃3)}2(2+𝜃)2(4+2𝛽+3𝜃−2𝛽𝜃)2 .                                           (9) 
In the first stage, the government chooses the degree of privatization that maximizes social 
welfare. The differentiation of 𝑊  in Eq. (9) with respect to 𝜃  yields the optimal degree of 
privatization. As it is difficult to obtain the explicit outcomes in the equilibrium, we assume 𝑐 = 1 
in the below analysis and then take numerical simulations with 𝛽 ∈ [0,1].11 Table 1 shows the 
equilibrium outcomes in this model, where subscript “P” denotes the equilibrium outcome of this 
game (Privatization-then-CSR case). 
<Table 1> 
From Table 1, we show that the optimal privatization is partial privatization in a privatization-
then-CSR case. Moreover, the effects of foreign penetration on optimal privatization and strategic 
CSR are different. In particular, foreign ownership reduces the strategic level of CSR, while 
influences the optimal degree of privatization non-monotonically. That is, as foreign penetration 
increases, the optimal privatization takes an inversed-U shape while the strategic CSR always 
decreases. This result differs from the result in Lin and Matsumura (2012), who shows that an 
increase in the foreign presence in the private firm monotonically decreases the optimal degree of 
privatization.12 However, when the foreign penetration is low, which supports a higher level of CSR, 
it increases the degree of privatization. The opposite result can be obtained when the foreign 
penetration is high. It also shows that marginal cost of the CSR-firm is lower than that of the public 
                                                          
10
 Note that 𝛽1 satisfies that 𝑐 − 2𝛽2(1 − 𝜃)2 − (1 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛽(9 + 𝑐 + 10𝜃 + 4𝑐𝜃 + 5𝜃2 + 𝑐𝜃2) = 0.  
11
 Note that we can check the results in the ranges of 𝑐 ∈ (0,1] using the figures and tables, and show that our 
main propositions still hold. Detailed analysis will be provided by authors upon request. 
12
 In a free entry mixed market, Matsumura and Kato (2005) showed that full nationalization is the optimal 
without foreign penetration while Cato and Matsumura (2012), Xu et al. (2017) and Lee et al. (2018) showed 
that the government always chooses partial privatization when there is foreign ownership in private firms. 
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firm. This is because the public firm produces more than the private firm at equilibrium. In addition, 
the effects of foreign penetration on the output of the private firm and the public firm are opposite. 
In particular, as foreign penetration increases, the output of the private firm decreases while the 
output of the public firm and total market output increases. Finally, the profit of the private firm and 
social welfare decrease as foreign penetration increases. 
3.2 CSR-then-privatization case 
We then consider the reverse case that the private firm can commit the level of strategic CSR before 
the government chooses the optimal degree of privatization. Using the equilibrium outcomes in the 
last stage, the differentiation of W in Eq. (7) with respect to 𝜃 yields:13 𝜃 = (1−𝛼)(1−𝛼−𝑐𝛼+𝛼𝛽+𝑐𝛼𝛽+𝛼𝛽2)1+3𝑐+𝑐2−𝛼−2𝑐𝛼+4𝛽+2𝑐𝛽−2𝛼𝛽+𝑐𝛼𝛽+𝛼2𝛽+𝛼𝛽2−𝛼2𝛽2.                                                         (10) 
A few remarks are in order. First, the privatization has non-monotonicity with regard to foreign 
penetration, and its impact on privatization depends on foreign penetration in CSR-then-
privatization case, i.e., 𝜕𝜃𝜕𝛽 <> 0  when 𝛽 <> 𝛽2 .14  Thus, the degree of privatization is decreasing in 
foreign penetration when the foreign penetration is low, while it is increasing in foreign penetration 
when the foreign penetration is high. Second, the effect of production cost difference on privatization 
is independent of foreign penetration, i.e., 𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑐 < 0. Thus, an increase in the cost of the private firm 
leads to a higher degree of privatization. Third, privatization has also non-monotonicity with regard 
to CSR activities, and the degree of privatization is increasing in CSR only when the cost difference 
is low but foreign penetration is high, otherwise, the degree of privatization is decreasing in CSR,15 
That is, we have that: (i) if 0 < 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐3, 𝜕𝜃𝜕𝛼 <> 0 when 𝛽 <> 𝛽3; and (ii) if 𝑐3 < 𝑐 ≤ 1, 𝜕𝜃𝜕𝛼 < 0 where 𝑐3 = 4−8𝛼+𝛼24𝛼+𝛼2−2. Hence, privatization policy and CSR activities complement each other in the CSR-
then-privatization case.  
By substituting Eq. (10) into 𝜋2 in Eq. (7), we obtain the profit function of the private firm: 
                                                          
13
 In the below, we show that the interior solutions exist in the CSR-then-privatization case, i.e., 𝜃 ∈ [0, 1] in 
the possible regions of 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. 
14
 Note that 𝛽2  satisfies that −2(2 + 𝑐) + 7𝛼 + 𝑐(3 + 𝑐)2𝛼 − (2 + 𝑐)2𝛼2 + 𝛼3 + 𝑐𝛼3 + (2𝑐(3 + 𝑐)𝛼 − 2(−1 +𝑐)𝛼2 − 2𝛼3 − 2𝑐𝛼3)𝛽 + (2(2 + 𝑐)𝛼 − 3𝛼2 + 2𝛼3 + 𝑐𝛼3)𝛽2 = 0.  
15
 Note that 𝛽3 satisfys that (2(2 + 𝑐) − 4(2 + 𝑐)𝛼 + 𝛼2 − 𝑐𝛼2)𝛽3 + (4 + 3𝑐(3 + 𝑐) − 2(4 + 3𝑐(3 + 𝑐))𝛼 + 𝛼2 +2𝑐𝛼2 − 𝑐2𝛼2)𝛽2 + (−5 + 𝑐(−5 + 𝑐(2 + 𝑐)) + 4𝛼 − 2𝑐(−2 + 𝑐(2 + 𝑐))𝛼 + 𝛼2 + 3𝑐𝛼2 + 3𝑐2𝛼2)𝛽 + −1 − 𝑐(5 +𝑐(5 + 𝑐)) + 2𝛼 + 2𝑐(2 + 𝑐)2𝛼 − 𝛼2 − 3𝑐𝛼2 − 2𝑐2𝛼2 = 0.  
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 𝜋2 = (2+𝑐+𝛼+𝛼𝛽−𝛼2𝛽)(4+4𝑐+𝑐2−6𝛼−6𝑐𝛼−𝑐2𝛼+2𝛼2+2𝑐𝛼2−2𝛼𝛽−𝑐𝛼𝛽−𝑐𝛼2𝛽)2(5+2𝛽+𝑐(7+2𝑐+𝛽)−2(2+2𝑐+𝛽)𝛼+(1+𝑐−𝑐𝛽)𝛼2)2 .                             (11) 
In the first stage, the owner of the private firm chooses the level of strategic CSR that 
maximizes its profit. The differentiation of 𝜋2 in Eq. (11) with respect to 𝛼 yields the strategic level 
of CSR. Again, we assume 𝑐 = 1 in the below analysis and then take numerical simulations with 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]. Table 2 shows the equilibrium outcomes in this model, where subscript “C” denotes the 
equilibrium outcome of this game (CSR-then-privatization case). 
<Table 2> 
From Table 2, we show that the optimal privatization is partial privatization in a CSR-then-
privatization case. Moreover, the effects of foreign penetration on optimal privatization and strategic 
CSR are the same. That is, as foreign penetration increases, both the optimal privatization and 
strategic CSR decrease. Thus, foreign ownership reduces not only the level of strategic CSR but the 
optimal degree of privatization. This is in sharp contrast to the result in the privatization-then-CSR 
case. It also shows that marginal cost of the CSR-firm is lower than that of the public firm in the 
CSR-then-privatization case. In addition, the effects of foreign penetration on the output of the 
private firm and the public firm are opposite. In particular, as foreign penetration increases, the 
output of the private firm decreases while the output of the public firm and total market output 
increases. Thus, similar to the privatization-then-CSR case, both profit of the private firm and social 
welfare decrease as foreign penetration increases. In sum, if the government privatizes the public 
firm which competing with a private firm with CSR activities, not only the share of foreign 
ownership but also the timeline of the game matter on the optimal privatization policy. 
4. Comparisons 
In this section, we will compare the equilibrium outcomes between the two scenarios and discuss 
some policy-relevant implications. We will focus on the case of 𝑐 = 1, but main findings still hold 
in the ranges of 𝑐 ∈ (0, 1] with minor modifications.16 
Proposition 1: The privatization-then-CSR case yields a lower (higher) degree of privatization 
while a higher (lower) level of CSR than the CSR-then-privatization case when the foreign 
penetration is sufficiently low (high). 
Proof: Comparisons show that: (i) 𝜃𝑃 <> 𝜃𝐶when 𝛽 <> 0.2939; and (ii) 𝛼𝑃 >< 𝛼𝐶 when 𝛽 <> 0.9488. 
                                                          
16
 In Appendix, we provide the sensitivity analysis of the propositions.  
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Proposition 1 implies that the two cases might yield opposite decisions of the government and 
the owner of a private firm, depending upon foreign penetration. In particular, when the share of 
foreign ownership is low, i.e., 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.2939, in the privatization-then-CSR case the optimal 
degree of privatization is lower (higher) but the strategic level of CSR is higher (lower) than that in 
the CSR-then-privatization case. By contrast, when the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently 
high, i.e., 0.9488 < 𝛽 ≤ 1, the reversed result is obtained. However, when the share of foreign 
ownership is intermediate, i.e., 0.2939 < 𝛽 < 0.9488, both the optimal degree of privatization and 
the strategic level of CSR are higher in the privatization-then-CSR case. Therefore, the effect of 
foreign penetration is imperative not only on the optimal decisions of the government and the private 
firm, but also on the strategic timing of commitment on CSR of the private firm. We can explain the 
intuition behinds these results. 
As an extreme case, when the private firm is largely owned by domestic investors, the 
government can set a lower degree of privatization, which can bring about a higher level of CSR 
(i.e., 𝜕𝛼𝜕𝜃 < 0 when 0 ≤ 𝛽 <  𝛽1) in a standard model of the privatization-then-CSR case where the 
government can commit its privatization policy before the private firm moves. This policy can 
reduce the production cost in the industry (cost-saving effect) and increase total outputs (output-
substitution effect).17 However, in a CSR-then-privatization case where the private firm can commit 
to its CSR before the government moves, it engages in a lower level of CSR in order to induce a 
higher degree of privatization. 18  (i.e., 𝜕𝜃𝜕𝛼 < 0  if 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛽3 ). Hence, the decisions on the 
privatization and CSR can be opposite. As the other extreme case, on the other hand, when the 
private firm is largely own by foreign investors, the results can be reversed in both the privatization-
then-CSR case and the CSR-then-privatization case.  
Finally, when the share of foreign ownership is neither high nor low, both the decision of CSR 
and that of privatization have monotonicity in either case, but both decisions are higher in the 
privatization-then-CSR case during the interaction of the cost-saving effect and output-substitution 
effect. In the following proposition 2, we can confirm the changes in the outputs in both cases. 
In sum, if the government privatizes the public firm under the strategic CSR of a private firm, 
not only the foreign ownership but also the timeline matter. As a result, the policy implications are 
contradictory when privatization is implemented in the presence of CSR under the different 
environments of market liberalization. 
                                                          
17
 In the presence of CSR-firm, the optimal privatization policy depends on the output-substitution effect and 
cost-saving effect among the firms. See Kim et al (2019). 
18
 In the presence of foreign penetration, the optimal privatization policy can be reversed depending on the 
different timeline in a free entry mixed market. See Xu et al. (2017) and Lee et al. (2018) 
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Proposition 2: The privatization-then-CSR case yields higher (lower) market output and lower 
(higher) market price than those in the CSR-then-privatization case when the foreign penetration is 
low (high). 
Proof: Comparisons show that 𝑄𝑃 >< 𝑄𝐶 and 𝑃𝑃 <> 𝑃𝐶when 𝛽 <> 0.7111. 
From Table 1 and 2, partial privatization is optimal and thus the output of a public firm is 
always higher than that of the private firm irrespective of foreign penetration in both timelines of 
the game. It also show that irrespective of foreign penetration, the output of the public (private) firm 
in the privatization-then-CSR is lower (higher) than that in the CSR-then-privatization case, i.e., 𝑞1𝐶 > 𝑞1𝑃 > 𝑞2𝑃 > 𝑞2𝐶. Since the timeline of the game affects different decisions of the government 
and the owner of the private firm, as shown in proposition 1, the two cases yield opposite output 
decisions of the managers of both firms. However, Proposition 2 states that in the privatization-then-
CSR case yields higher total market output than that in the CSR-then-privatization case except for 
the case when foreign ownership is sufficiently high. Thus, the cost-saving effect might outweigh 
the output-substitution effect in determining optimal decisions between the government and the 
owner of a private firm. In particular, when the private firm is largely own by domestic investors, 
the government decides a lower degree of privatization under the privatization-then-CSR case, 
which encourages a higher level of CSR and increases higher total market output than that in the 
CSR-then-privatization case. The results are mostly beneficial to both the government and the owner 
of a private firm, as shown in the below proposition. 
Proposition 3: The privatization-then-CSR case yields a lower (higher) profit to the private firm 
while a higher (lower) welfare to the government than the CSR-then-privatization case when the 
foreign penetration is sufficiently low (high). 
Proof: Comparisons show that: (i) 𝜋2𝑃 <> 𝜋2𝐶 when 𝛽 <> 0.1904; and (ii) 𝑊𝑃 >< 𝑊𝐶when 𝛽 <> 0.9459. 
Proposition 3 also implies that the two cases yield opposite payoffs to the government and the 
owner of a private firm, depending upon foreign penetration. If the private firm is largely own by 
domestic investors, both the owner of the private firm and the government prefers the privatization-
then-CSR case. However, if the private firm is largely own by foreign investors, the reverse 
preferences appear. Finally, in the intermediate case of foreign penetration, both the government and 
the owner of the private firm have opposite preferences. In the following section, using these 
findings, we will investigate the incentives of endogenous timing of the game between the 
government and the owner of the private firm. 
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5. Endogenous timing game 
We adopt an observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and analyze the 
timing of the movement between the government and the owner of the private firm. In particular, 
the government chooses the timing of a privatization policy that maximizes welfare while the owner 
of the private firm chooses the timing of CSR commitment that maximizes the profit of the private 
firm. Then, we consider an endogenous timing game, in which both government and the owner of the 
private firm simultaneously chooses whether to move early (𝑇𝑖 = 1) or late (𝑇𝑖 = 2). Table 3 provides the 
payoff matrix of the observable delay game in this game. If both choose the same period, the equilibrium 
is a simultaneous-move game, which is denoted as the superscript S in Table 3. Otherwise, the 
equilibrium is a sequential-move game of the privatization-then-CSR case or the CSR-then-
privatization case.  
<Table 3> 
5.1 Simultaneous case 
We first analyze the simultaneous case where both the government and the owner of the private firm 
move at the same time. Then, using the equilibrium outcomes in the final stage in Eq. (7), we can 
take both differentiations of welfare with respect to 𝜃 and of the profit of firm 2 with respect to 𝛼, 
simultaneously and independently. Table 4 shows the equilibrium outcomes in this model. 
<Table 4> 
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes in the three models in Figure 1, we have the following lemmas. 
<Figure 1> 
Lemma 1: 𝜃𝐶 > 𝜃𝑆 and  𝜃𝑃 <> 𝜃𝑆 when 𝛽 <> 0.024.  
Proof: Comparisons show that: (i) 𝜃𝐶 > 𝜃𝑆 > 𝜃𝑃 when 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.024; (ii) 𝜃𝐶 > 𝜃𝑃 ≥ 𝜃𝑆 when 0.024 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.294; and (iii) 𝜃𝑃 ≥ 𝜃𝐶 > 𝜃𝑆 when 0.294 ≤ 𝛽 < 1.  
Lemma 1 states that the optimal degree of privatization in a simultaneous case is always lower 
than that in the CSR-then-privatization case, and it is also lower than that in the privatization-then-
CSR case except when the foreign penetration is sufficiently low. Thus, the simultaneous case will 
less privatize than the other sequential cases.  
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Lemma 2: 𝛼𝑃 > 𝛼𝑆 and 𝛼𝐶 <> 𝛼𝑆 when 𝛽 <> 0.914. 
Proof: Comparing the strategic levels of CSR yields: (i) 𝛼𝑃 > 𝛼𝑆 > 𝛼𝐶 when 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.914; (ii) 𝛼𝑃 > 𝛼𝐶 ≥ 𝛼𝑆 when 0.914 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.949; and (iii) 𝛼𝐶 ≥ 𝛼𝑃 > 𝛼𝑆 when 0.949 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
Lemma 2 states that the strategic level of CSR in a simultaneous case is always lower than that 
in the privatization-then-CSR case, but it will be higher than that in the CSR-then-privatization case 
except when the foreign penetration is sufficiently high. Thus, as shown in proposition 1, foreign 
ownership influences the opposite decisions of the government and the owner of a private firm in 
the different sequential games, and thus the simultaneous case will be intermediate between the two 
sequential cases.  
Lemma 3: Comparing the profits of the private firm yields the following relationships: 19  
(i) 𝜋2𝐶 > 𝜋2𝑆 > 𝜋2𝑃 when 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.017; 
(ii) 𝜋2𝐶 > 𝜋2𝑃 ≥ 𝜋2𝑆 when 0.017 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.190; 
(iii) 𝜋2𝑃 ≥ 𝜋2𝐶 > 𝜋2𝑆 when 0.190 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.742; 
(iv) 𝜋2𝑃 > 𝜋2𝑆 ≥ 𝜋2𝐶 when 0.742 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
Proof: Comparing the profits yields: (a) 𝜋1𝑃 <> 𝜋1𝑆 when 𝛽 <> 0.037; 𝜋1𝑃 <> 𝜋1𝐶 when 𝛽 <> 0.676; 𝜋1𝐶 >< 𝜋1𝑆 
when 𝛽 <> 0.919; (b) 𝜋2𝑃 <> 𝜋2𝑆 when 𝛽 <> 0.017; 𝜋2𝑃 <> 𝜋2𝐶when 𝛽 <> 0.190; 𝜋2𝐶 >< 𝜋2𝑆 when 𝛽 <> 0.742. 
Lemma 3 states that the equilibrium profit of the private firm depends on foreign penetration 
and the order of privatization and CSR policies. In particular, the CSR-then-privatization case yields 
the highest profit of the private firm when the foreign penetration is sufficiently low, i.e., 0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤0.190, while it yields the lowest profit when the foreign penetration  is sufficiently high, 0.742 ≤𝛽 ≤ 1. Reversely, the privatization-then-CSR case yields the highest social welfare when the foreign 
penetration is not sufficiently low, i.e., 0.190 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1, while it yields the lowest profit when the 
foreign penetration  is sufficiently low, i.e., 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.017. Thus, foreign penetration provides the 
opposite profit rankings to the private firm. 
Lemma 4: Comparing the social welfares yields the following relationships: 
(i) 𝑊𝑃 ≥ 𝑊𝑆 > 𝑊𝐶 when 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.927; 
(ii) 𝑊𝑃 > 𝑊𝐶 ≥ 𝑊𝑆 when 0.927 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.946; 
(iii) 𝑊𝐶 ≥ 𝑊𝑃 > 𝑊𝑆 when 0.946 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
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 Note that if 𝑐 ∈ (0,3/4], we have 𝜋2𝐶 > 𝜋2𝑆 and thus, (iv) disappears. 
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Proof: Comparing the social welfare yields: (a) 𝑊𝑃 ≥ 𝑊𝑆 and the equality holds only when 𝛽 = 0; 
(b) 𝑊𝑆 >< 𝑊𝐶 when 𝛽 <> 0.927; (c) 𝑊𝑃 >< 𝑊𝐶when 𝛽 <> 0.946. 
Lemma 4 states that the equilibrium social welfare depends on foreign penetration and the order 
of privatization and CSR policies. In particular, the privatization-then-CSR case yields the highest 
social welfare when the foreign penetration is not sufficiently high i.e., 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.946, while the 
CSR-then-privatization case the highest social welfare when the foreign penetration  is sufficiently 
high, i.e., 0.946 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1 . However, when the foreign penetration is not sufficiently low, i.e., 0.927 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1 ,  the lowest social welfare could be obtained in the simultaneous case. In the 
opposite, when the private firm fully owned by the domestic investor, the highest social welfare 
could be obtained in the privatization-then-CSR case. 
5.2 Equilibrium of an endogenous timing game 
We can finally provide the Nash equilibrium of the endogenous timing game between the 
government and the owner of the private firm. 
Proposition 4: In an endogenous timing game: 
(i) when 𝛽 ∈ [0, 0.017), the simultaneous-move outcome, (𝑇1, 𝑇2) = (1,1), is the unique equilibrium 
outcome; 
(ii) when 𝛽 = 0.017, the simultaneous-move outcome, (𝑇1, 𝑇2) = (1,1), and the privatization-then-
CSR outcome, (𝑇1, 𝑇2) = (1,2), are the equilibrium outcomes; 
(iii) when 𝛽 ∈ (0.017,1] , the privatization-then-CSR outcome, (𝑇1, 𝑇2) = (1,2) , is the unique 
equilibrium outcome. 
Proof: From Lemma 3 and 4, we can obtain that: (a) 𝜋2𝑃 <> 𝜋2𝑆 when 𝛽 <> 0.017; (b) 𝜋2𝐶 >< 𝜋2𝑆 when 𝛽 <> 0.742; (c) 𝑊𝑆 >< 𝑊𝐶 when 𝛽 <> 0.927; and (d) 𝑊𝑃 ≥ 𝑊𝑆. 
Proposition 4 reports the equilibrium of an endogenous timing game in which foreign 
ownership matters but both the sequential case and the simultaneous case could be an equilibrium. In 
particular, the simultaneous case can be a unique equilibrium only when the foreign penetration is 
sufficiently low, i.e., 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 0.017, while the privatization-then-CSR case can be a unique 
equilibrium otherwise. It also states that the CSR-then-privatization case can never be an equilibrium 
in an endogenous timing game. However, from Lemma 4, the CSR-then-privatization case can lead 
to the highest social welfare when the foreign penetration  is sufficiently high, i.e., 0.946 < 𝛽 ≤ 1. 
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Proposition 5: The privatization-then-CSR is socially desirable when the foreign penetration is neither 
sufficiently low nor high. 
Proof: From Lemma 4 and Proposition 4, we can show that the privatization-then-CSR case is a Nash 
equilibrium and yields the highest welfare among three scenarios when 0.017 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 0.946. 
Proposition 5 states that the privatization-then-CSR case can be a unique equilibrium in an 
endogenous timing game and it is also socially desirable when the foreign penetration is neither 
sufficiently low nor high. Thus, a standard approach in the modeling of the timeline of the game between 
the government and the firms is feasible and desirable only when the foreign penetration is 
intermediate.20 This also implies that a flexible privatization policy in a time-inconsistent framework, 
which lacks the commitment to future privatization policy, may lead to the worst social welfare.21 
6. Conclusions 
This study considers an interplay between the privatization policy and CSR, and investigates the 
impact of the order of the sequential games. We highlight the significant role of the foreign 
shareholding ratio and show that partial privatization is always optimal regardless of the timeline of 
the game. We also show that the privatization-then-CSR case yields a lower degree of privatization 
while a higher level of CSR than the CSR-then-privatization case when the foreign penetration is 
sufficiently low, while the opposite result is obtained when it is high. Therefore, foreign penetration 
is an important factor to determine the optimal decisions between the government and the private 
firm. We also find that the incentive of choosing the timing of movement might differ, depending 
on foreign penetration. Finally, we show that the privatization-then-CSR game is a unique 
equilibrium in an endogenous timing game and it is also socially desirable when the foreign penetration 
is neither sufficiently low nor high. These findings support the standard approach in modeling the 
optimal privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly. 
A limitation of this study is that we assume that neither the privatization policy nor foreign 
ownership affects the production cost. Although these are standard assumptions in the literature on 
mixed oligopolies, an extension in this direction may be interesting. One possible way of modeling 
is incorporating technology licensing and spillovers among the firms.22 Finally, as open market 
                                                          
20
 Note that from footnote 19, if 𝑐 ∈ (0,3/4], (𝑇1, 𝑇2) = (2,1) can be an equilibrium outcome. Thus, the CSR- 
then- privatization is an equilibrium and socially desirable when the foreign penetration is relatively high. See 
Appendix. 
21
 In a free entry mixed market, flexible privatization policy can provide welfare loss in the absence of 
commitment. See Xu et al. (2017), Lee et al. (2018) and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2020b). 
22
 Chang et al. (2016) and Wang et al. (2016) presented models of international licensing in private oligopolies, 
while Kim et al. (2018) and Wang et al. (2020) analyzed public licensing in mixed oligopolies. 
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policy on liberalization enlarges more foreign penetration, the new entry might affect the 
competition modes among the firms, such as Stackelberg leadership or price competition, which 
affect the optimal policy of the government.23 This also remains for future research.  
Appendix: The sensitivity of the propositions  
Proposition A1: Main findings in Proposition 1 hold, except 𝛼𝑃 > 𝛼𝐶 if 𝑐 ∈ (0, 14].  
It implies that the privatization-then-CSR case yields a lower (higher) degree of privatization than 
the CSR-then-privatization case when the foreign penetration is sufficiently low (high) irrespective 
of the value of 𝑐. However, if 𝑐 ∈ (0, 14], the privatization-then-CSR case always yields a higher 
level of CSR than the CSR-then-privatization case irrespective of the foreign penetration. 
Proposition A2: Main findings in Proposition 2 hold when 𝑐 ∈ (0, 1]. 
Proposition A3: Main findings in Proposition 3 hold when 𝑐 ∈ (0, 1]. 
Proposition A4: Main findings in Proposition 4 hold, but the CSR- then- privatization can be an 
equilibrium outcome when the foreign penetration is high if 𝑐 ∈ (0, 34]. 
Proposition A5: Main findings in Proposition 5 hold, but the CSR- then- privatization is socially 
desirable when the foreign penetration is high if 𝑐 ∈ (0, 34]. 
It implies that the privatization-then-CSR case can be an equilibrium in an endogenous timing game 
and socially desirable when the foreign penetration is neither low nor high irrespective of the value of 𝑐. However, if 𝑐 ∈ (0, 34], the CSR-then-privatization can be also an equilibrium and socially desirable 
when the foreign penetration is relatively high. Thus, the modeling of the opposite timeline of the game 
between the government and the firms is also feasible and desirable when the cost difference is not so 
small and the foreign penetration is sufficiently high. 
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TABLES 𝛽 𝜃𝑃 𝛼𝑃 𝑞1𝑃 𝑞2𝑃 𝑄𝑃 𝑃𝑃 𝜋1𝑃 𝜋2𝑃 𝑊𝑃 
0 0.10570  0.19960  0.35327  0.25612  0.60939  0.39061  0.07559  0.06724  0.32851  
0.1 0.12416  0.17356  0.36459  0.24720  0.61179  0.38821  0.07508  0.06541  0.32109  
0.2 0.13539  0.15055  0.37576  0.23893  0.61469  0.38531  0.07419  0.06352  0.31392  
0.3 0.14163  0.12967  0.38681  0.23110  0.61792  0.38208  0.07298  0.06160  0.30701  
0.4 0.14430  0.11038  0.39777  0.22361  0.62137  0.37863  0.07150  0.05966  0.30035  
0.5 0.14433  0.09238  0.40861  0.21638  0.62499  0.37502  0.06975  0.05773  0.29392  
0.6 0.14238  0.07546  0.41933  0.20937  0.62870  0.37130  0.06778  0.05582  0.28774  
0.7 0.13888  0.05948  0.42992  0.20257  0.63248  0.36752  0.06559  0.05393  0.28178  
0.8 0.13417  0.04435  0.44035  0.19596  0.63631  0.36370  0.06320  0.05207  0.27606  
0.9 0.12848  0.02999  0.45062  0.18953  0.64015  0.35986  0.06063  0.05024  0.27055  
1 0.12202  0.01637  0.46071  0.18328  0.64399  0.35601  0.05789  0.04845  0.26525  
TABLE 1 Equilibrium outcomes in the privatization-then-CSR case  
𝛽 𝜃𝐶 𝛼𝐶 𝑞1𝐶 𝑞2𝐶 𝑄𝐶 𝑃𝐶 𝜋1𝐶 𝜋2𝐶 𝑊𝐶 
0 0.18795  0.02525  0.35685  0.21923  0.57608  0.42392  0.08760  0.06891  0.32244  
0.1 0.16861  0.02507  0.37032  0.21478  0.58510  0.41490  0.08508  0.06605  0.31569  
0.2 0.15316  0.02473  0.38324  0.21048  0.59372  0.40628  0.08227  0.06336  0.30921  
0.3 0.14053  0.02429  0.39564  0.20633  0.60197  0.39804  0.07921  0.06084  0.30298  
0.4 0.13001  0.02378  0.40755  0.20232  0.60987  0.39013  0.07595  0.05846  0.29700  
0.5 0.12111  0.02324  0.41901  0.19845  0.61745  0.38255  0.07251  0.05622  0.29124  
0.6 0.11348  0.02267  0.43003  0.19471  0.62474  0.37526  0.06891  0.05411  0.28571  
0.7 0.10686  0.02210  0.44064  0.19111  0.63175  0.36825  0.06518  0.05211  0.28037  
0.8 0.10106  0.02152  0.45087  0.18762  0.63849  0.36151  0.06135  0.05023  0.27523  
0.9 0.09594  0.02095  0.46073  0.18426  0.64499  0.35501  0.05743  0.04844  0.27028  
1 0.09138  0.02039  0.47024  0.18101  0.65126  0.34874  0.05343  0.04674  0.26550  
TABLE 2 Equilibrium outcomes in the CSR-then-privatization case 
Government/The owner of firm 2 𝑇2 = 1 𝑇2 = 2 𝑇1 = 1 (𝑊𝑆, 𝜋2𝑆) (𝑊𝑃 , 𝜋2𝑃) 𝑇1 = 2 (𝑊𝐶 , 𝜋2𝐶) (𝑊𝑆, 𝜋2𝑆) 
TABLE 3 Payoff matrix in an endogenous timing game 
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𝛽 𝜃𝑆 𝛼𝑆 𝑞1𝑆 𝑞2𝑆 𝑄𝑆 𝑃𝑆 𝜋1𝑆 𝜋2𝑆 𝑊𝑆 
0 0.10927  0.19957  0.35258  0.25631  0.60889  0.39111  0.07574  0.06740  0.32851  
0.1 0.11255  0.17325  0.36707  0.24641  0.61348  0.38652  0.07451  0.06488  0.32108  
0.2 0.11382  0.14940  0.38076  0.23719  0.61794  0.38206  0.07298  0.06249  0.31390  
0.3 0.11365  0.12756  0.39374  0.22855  0.62229  0.37772  0.07121  0.06021  0.30697  
0.4 0.11239  0.10741  0.40611  0.22040  0.62650  0.37350  0.06922  0.05803  0.30029  
0.5 0.11028  0.08872  0.41792  0.21267  0.63060  0.36940  0.06705  0.05595  0.29385  
0.6 0.10747  0.07132  0.42925  0.20534  0.63458  0.36542  0.06473  0.05395  0.28766  
0.7 0.10408  0.05505  0.44012  0.19834  0.63846  0.36154  0.06227  0.05204  0.28170  
0.8 0.10020  0.03981  0.45058  0.19166  0.64224  0.35776  0.05969  0.05020  0.27597  
0.9 0.09589  0.02550  0.46066  0.18527  0.64593  0.35407  0.05700  0.04844  0.27046  
1 0.09120  0.01268  0.46890  0.17978  0.64868  0.35133  0.05480  0.04700  0.26519  
TABLE 4 Equilibrium outcomes in a simultaneous case 
 
